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Abstract. This is a comment on some aspects of the The 
Ethics of the Information by Luciano Floridi. This paper 
explores some of the notions advanced in the book, its 
methodology, and its practical and ontological turn. In the 
end, some suggestions are made about the relationship 
between Information Ethics (IE), policy, and law. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Ethics of the Information is a freely written book by 
a free thinker.1 This statement intends to be more than 
a rhetorical one. Freedom means liberty. Liberty to think 
aloof. Liberty to dive into the philosophical tradition 
with a fresh gaze. And liberty to quote freely those past 
and present thinkers that Luciano Floridi believes to be 
quotable according to the subject he is dealing with, and 
the argument he is fleshing out. Academic writing puts 
forward some tacit rules—do avoid conveying personal 
feelings, do not cite incompatible schools, remain stuck to 
a single way of thinking; especially, never use the pronoun
I. He breaches them all. To breach rules and keep reading 
and referring to Quine, Church, and Moore as often as to 
Deleuze, Cassirer, and Lacan without falling into syncretism 
is the privilege of an independent mind. It is a rare quality. 
Let’s put it differently. If the author of this book were 
asked “Do you believe in God?,” most likely he would 
reply as Einstein did: “I believe in Spinoza’s God.” Do not 
laugh, do not weep, do not wax indignant. Understand. He 
invites his fellow readers to understand what is happening 
through a literary, pervasive, and sometimes irritating I
that creates a complete series of neologisms to express 
his interrelationship and interface within the informational 
world—infosphere, inforgs, conceptual design, 
hyperhistorical predicament, ITentities, re-ontologization, 
ontological friction, onlife experience, nested telepresence, 
foreward and backwards presence, metaphysical entropy, 
artificial evil, ecumenical axiology, homo poieticus, ecology 
of the self, ecopoiesis, informational privacy, informational 
structural realism, environmental ethics, distributed 
morality, etc. 
Let’s try to situate their standpoint. If The Ethics of the 
Information were a mere invitation to dialogue, these terms 
would constitute metaphors the author would live by. A 
kind of holistic semantic network. But Floridi is carefully 
operating at each step through what he calls levels of 
abstraction (LoA), a methodological approach that allows a 
cartographic perspective to grade the conceptual map over 
the epistemic territory: he defines at each step the meaning 
of the terms, but he shows first the correlate references 
and co-references they intend to denote. This is what 
structural realism consists of. A sort of low and upgraded 
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phenomenology of the living web, to be discussed with 
and within the self-reflecting entities of the living web. 
To use his own words when he faces identity, he individuates
before identifying as informational entities the objects he 
is referring to. And he displays them through an articulated 
language, comprising the chosen level of abstraction (LoA), 
the informational and cognitive structure of those objects, 
and the type of complex representation that links them. 
So, not only answers but research questions are equally 
introduced to be discussed alongside with the reader. 
2. THE ETHICS OF THE INFORMATION AS A
METALOGUE 
There is a semantic and pragmatic threshold then that 
the reader is gently required to cross over. Better than a 
dialogue, this game can be more adequately defined as a 
metalogue, an interactive and multi-leveled philosophical 
conversation about what thinking, writing, reading, and 
talking mean through the new technological conditions 
of contemporary life. It is worth noticing that this is a 
discourse (i) focused on the phenomenological existence
of clusters, entities of information, (ii) and on the structure 
of its conditions: “To be present is to be the value of a 
typed variable of LoA.”2 In other words, to be present is to 
be digitized at a certain level. 
This assumption made, the book enters into a self-
referential but interactive analytical space in which the 
author’s I dissolves to expand the relational reality—hybrid, 
a mixture of physical and artificial—he is proposing to 
explore and disclose gradually in between. For “to be is 
to be interactable.”3 This is not assuming an inner and 
outer dimension of the infosphere, but the infosphere as a 
primordial Umwelt, as the place in which we all already are 
supposed to live, sense, feel, think and communicate as 
producers and consumers (prosumers) of content. Umwelt
points at the inescapable ecological environment in which 
informational units are present, including our encapsulated 
identity. “The self, and mental life in general,” he states, “is 
located in the brain but not present in the brain. Thus the 
locus of the self is the brain but the self is not present in 
the brain.”4 
This largely resonates with the cybernetic perspective 
that Norbert Wiener and Gregory Bateson set up at the 
beginning of our information age, after World War II. 
Sometimes we [Bateson/Wiener] used to discuss 
whether a computer can think. The answer is “no.” 
What thinks is a complete circuit that might include 
a computer, a man and the environment. Similarly, 
we can ask whether the brain can think, and again 
the answer is “no.” What thinks is a brain that is 
inside of a man, who is part of a system comprising 
a room. Drawing a boundary line between a part 
(which does most of the computation to a larger 
system) and the larger system of which this is 
part means creating a mythological component 
commonly called I or self.5 
Almost paradoxically, this mythical I is the only place where 
we can personalize the delocalized interface from which 
we are gathering, assembling, storing, and processing 
information. There is something interesting in the main 
idea that knowledge is always socially and collectively 
embedded or, coming back to Floridi’s formulation, in 
the idea that we all constitute units of self-organized 
information capable to “semanticize” our ecological niche, 
the infosphere. 
The rejection of anthropocentrism is not new. Bateson’s 
“ecology of mind” (1972), Herbert Simon’s and Allen 
Newell’s “artificial intelligence” (1969), Minsky’s “society 
of mind” (1976), and Arne Naess’s idea of “deep ecology” 
(2005) were all grounded on some structured representation 
of a shared and common knowledge too, rooted onto 
a complex environment and able to be computed in an 
independent way. Their modeling was “constructionist” as 
well: they were building up conceptual models to grasp the 
nature of ecology or of computational science—”sciences 
of design”—as complex systems. However, to do so, they 
didn’t need to equate their conceptual universe with a 
sharp idea of Being. Ontology, in the classical philosophical 
sense I will expose in the last section, was never a real issue 
for them. They had instead a strong sense of the sacred, of 
the boundaries of human knowledge. 
Floridi, on the contrary, situates ontology at the center of his 
formulation: “Being and the Infosphere are co-referential. 
[. . .] The Infosphere is the totality of Being [emphasis 
added], hence the environment constituted by the totality 
of informational entities, including all agents, along with 
their processes, properties, and mutual relations.”6 In a 
nutshell: 
IE [Information Ethics] is an ecological ethics that 
replaces biocentrism with ontocentrism, and then 
interprets Being in informational terms. It suggests 
that there is something more elemental than life, 
namely Being, the existence and flourishing of 
all entities and their global environment, and 
something more fundamental than suffering, 
namely, nothingness. It then interprets Being 
and nothingness at an informational level of 
abstraction, as infosphere and entropy, on the 
basis on an informational structured realism as 
articulated in Floridi (2011, chs. 14 and 15). In 
short, it is an environmental ethics based on 
the phenomena and corresponding concepts of 
information/infosphere/entropy rather than life/ 
ecosystem/pain.7 
3. THE PRACTICAL TURN 
Why is the author choosing this formulation? Why is he 
remaining in the philosophical language of Being (Sein), 
Presence (Dasein), Care (Sorge), and, most surprisingly, 
Nothingness (Nichts)? After the harsh Neo-positivist 
logical attack on the Heideggerian Das Nichts nichtet, it 
would be difficult to imagine for an analytical philosopher 
of the twentieth century to consistently keep such clear 
references to ostensive phenomenology in carrying out his 
general project on information ethics. 
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A possible answer is that Floridi is not a philosopher of 
the twentieth century, but a thinker past and beyond the 
linguistic turn, less worried with his own language than 
realistically committed to the description of what he 
perceives as a radical new way of living brought about 
by the sudden explosion of the digital world. If I could 
develop further the metalogical game I started above, 
I would rather imagine him in the Baroque Age, in good 
company with the giants of rationalism, enjoying and taking 
into account the content of the Bible, the Gospel, Greek 
and Latin philosophy, medieval and renaissance arts and 
crafts, and turning the results of science and mathematics 
into philosophical concepts that would stand by their own, 
more geometrico. 
For instance, how to avoid evil—what Floridi calls now 
artificial evil, a hybrid between natural and moral evil this 
time—was one of the main obsessions not only of Spinoza, 
but of Hobbes and Leibniz as well.8 All three thinkers are 
easily retrievable from Floridi’s writing. Especially Spinoza, 
whose concepts of substance (i.e., information) and conatus
(i.e., maintenance of Being), are directly and indirectly 
quoted in the book. 
Let’s reproduce the four principles of Information Ethics: 
(i) entropy ought not to be caused in the infosphere, (ii) 
entropy ought to be prevented in the infosphere, (iii) 
entropy ought to be removed from the infosphere, (iv) the 
flourishing of informational entities as well of the whole 
infosphere ought to be promoted by preserving, cultivating, 
and enriching their well-being. 
Classical works by Cassirer, Hazard, and Skinner, to 
quote three different historical schools and languages, 
come easily to mind. The inner connection between the 
growing protection of rights (life, goods, property) and the 
evolution from security to happiness in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries is a well-established fact in 
intellectual history.9 In this sense, IE seems to be firmly 
rooted on the British Enlightenment as much as on the 
Neo-Kantian synthesis. Do notice the preventive and 
negative character of the three first principles (not causing, 
preventing, removing), and the positive but prudential 
attitude shown in the last one (cultivating, enriching, but 
preserving). Metaphysical entropy is the kind of loss, 
destruction, or damage caused on informational entities. 
The other way around, enriched, enhanced, or augmented 
ethics is intended to monitor the ecology of the infosphere, 
balancing the decreasing of ontological friction, and thus 
promoting the expansion and well-being of these entities 
in it.10 Let us explain what this term is referring to, taking a 
short detour by what I will call the practical turn of IE. 
The Internet and its semantic counterpart, Web 2.0 (social 
web) and 3.0 (the Internet of Things, the Semantic Web), 
should not be confused with the infosphere, in Floridi’s 
usage. The former can be understood as technical 
descriptive concepts. The latter incorporates a normative
dimension that is user-centered, focused on the creative and 
social behavior of agents (be they individual or collective), 
and it can be paraphrased as the ultimate boundaries of 
their onlife experience. And “hyperhistory [the kind of 
history inaugurated by the use of computational devices] 
happens onlife.”11 From this point of view, the infosphere 
is the natural housing of contemporary subjects or, better, 
of the bundle of information that constitutes them as such. 
Protecting the infosphere entails therefore to protect the
identity of its more complex, self-reflecting, and conscious 
entities: “Selves are the final stage in the development 
of informational structures, for they are the semantically
structuring structures [emphasis added] conscious of 
themselves.”12 
It means that, as macro-ethics, IE embraces innovative 
foundations (as opposed to deontologist, consequentalist, 
or contractualist ethics) and possesses a regulatory side. 
This is the practical turn. It only requires a minimal moral 
axiology and some procedural rules to be put in place. 
Good and evil will depend upon specific criteria along 
a gradual chain of moral value in a sort of “axiological 
ecumenism.”13 But, and this constitutes the IE turn-off from 
liberal enlightenment, Floridi resolutely embraces the non­
standard, allocentric approach, already taken in bioethics, 
medical, and environmental ethics that “seek to develop a 
patient-oriented ethics in which the receiver of the moral 
action may not be only a human being, but also any form of 
life.”14 In a similar way, IE is centered on the informational 
entity that receives the action, rather than on its relation or 
relevance to the agent. 
This patient-approach reveals particularly fruitful to draw 
the structure of moral agency, as moral agents are defined 
at an informational LoA of reality as “any interactive, 
autonomous, and adaptable transition systems that can 
perform moral justifiable acts.”15 But human individuals, 
artificial artifacts, institutions, and, especially, Multi-Agent 
Systems (MAS) are accountable (not always responsible) 
for the events and acts performed over other patient 
agents that receive the effects of their behavior.16 IE makes 
a choice, then, in favor of the victims, the holders of rights, 
rather than fostering agency qua moral agency. I think this is 
particularly important to understand the kind of ontological 
turn that the author is proposing to ground ITC tools on the 
defense of rights and the correct and effective deployment 
and evolution of the infosphere. Thus, enhancing plurality 
is a better strategy than harmonizing such a deployment 
from a single or monotonic point of view. 
The “tragedy of the Good Will”—the lack of balance 
between power and information—constitutes one example 
of such a perspective opened up by IE. Nowadays it is 
perfectly possible, for instance, as already happened in 
2004 with the tsunamis caused by the Sumatra-Andaman 
earthquake, witnessing in real time their devastating effects 
without having the effective ICT tools to prevent them. 
Another privileged example is informational privacy, which 
is defined as follows: “informational privacy is a function 
of the ontological friction in the infosphere.”17 Ontological 
friction refers to “the forces that oppose the information 
flow within the infosphere, and hence (as a coefficient) the 
amount of work and effort required for some kind of agent 
to obtain, filter, and/or block information about other agents 
in a given environment.”18 According to Floridi, classic ITC 
tools used to decrease the degree of ontological friction 
among agents, and therefore decreased their level of 
privacy as well. However, new generation of protections— 
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through Privacy Enhancement Technologies (PETs) or the 
recent Privacy by Design Technologies (PbD)—are able to 
reverse the situation, balancing the level of protection with 
the increasing information flow. This certainly constitutes 
one of the next challenges in the development of the 
infosphere. 
4. THE ONTOLOGICAL TURN 
I think the author succeeds in convincing the reader of 
the interest of developing IE as a foundation for computer 
ethics, business ethics, and the kind of meta-theory that is 
needed to link moral codes and regulations to computer 
science. But the quest for a meaningful reality should not 
conceal some difficulties in this endeavor. 
Perhaps the first one comes from the redefinition of some 
notions whose functional meaning has been already well 
established in artificial intelligence and engineering. This 
is the case, for example, with Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). 
The term usually refers to software agents in computerized 
systems composed of multiple interacting intelligent agents 
within a given environment. It is certainly true that MAS can 
be constituted by a combination of software and human 
agents. However, the author’s use of the term seems to 
cover all sorts of social groups—institutions, government 
agencies, companies, NGOs, among other organizations. 
Although the intentional meaning of such a broad use is 
clear—mainly not to confuse moral agents with individuals, 
stressing its social component—the use of the term could 
be more consistently defined, as it has recently proposed 
relating to institutions and norms (the so-called nMAS).19 
The more confusing notion is precisely ontology. In 
philosophy, this term does not belong to the rich Greek 
tradition. The term ontology goes back to the beginning 
of the seventeenth century in the Netherlands. Johann 
Clauberg, Rudolf Göckel (Goclenius), and Juan Caramuel de 
Lobkowitz used the term before Christian Wolff (Philosophia 
prima sive ontologia methodo scientifica pertractata, qua 
omnes cognitionis humanae principia continentur, 1730). 
According to recent research, it seems that it was first 
coined by Jakob Lorhard (Ogdoas Scholastica, 1606), and 
based at its turn on Clemens Timpler’s work Metaphysicae 
Systema Methodicum (1604). Ontology was a term 
specifically born in the Protestant philosophical ambience 
to counterbalance the use of the term metaphysics (referred 
to the being) established by the formidable defenders of 
the Catholic Counter-Reformation, among them Francisco 
Suárez (Disputationes Metaphysicae, published in Mainz 
in 1606).20 Ontologia meant the intelligible dimension of 
being and the organization of knowledge, thus stressing 
its human side. All of this is well-known and do not intend 
to lecture the reader. 
I am referring to it because these philosophical origins are 
compatible—but not identical—with the use of the term in 
contemporary computer science.21 Ontologies, in plural, 
are formal vocabularies plotting the machine scalable and 
reusable conceptual structures shared by a community of 
users to solve problems such as semantic interoperability 
and transportability.22 
One of the pillars of Floridi’s book is the thesis of re­
ontologization of ICTs referred to “a very radical form of 
engineering, one that not only designs, constructs or 
structures a system (e.g. a company, a machine, or some 
artifact) anew, but one that also fundamentally transforms 
its intrinsic nature, that is, its ontology or essence [emphasis 
added]”23—e.g., the transition from analogue to digital 
data, the convergence between digital resources and 
digital tools, etc. 
It seems to me that such a statement involves the 
description of social processes in a way that departs from 
the regular philosophical or computational use of the term. 
To Floridi, practical use of ontologies in a globalized 
world deals more with communication and shared 
common references than with the technical possibility to 
interconnect formally semantic languages: “I am using 
‘ontology’ to cover the outcome of a variety of processes 
that allow an agent to appropriate (be successful embedded 
in), semanticize (give meaning to and make sense of), 
and conceptualize (order, understand, and explain) her 
environment, through a wealth of levels of abstraction. In 
simplified terms, one’s ontology is one’s world: that is, the 
world as it appears to, is experienced by and interacted 
with, the agent in question.”24 This use reminds the use 
of Wittgensteinian concepts in hermeneutic sociology, 
as famously put forward, e.g., in the late fifties by Peter 
Winch (1958): cross-cultural communication would entail 
partaking a shared knowledge of the same world. But this 
interpretation has little to do with the technical means that 
make possible the cross-communication between natural 
and formal languages. 
Both to explain or to design web services, platforms, 
and mobile applications in an iterative and feasible way, 
semantic web programming languages and anchoring the 
ontological level through editors such Protégé or Kaon 
on socially constructed contexts are needed. Of course 
this is not the purpose of the book: “Understanding 
philosophy as conceptual design means giving up not on 
its foundationalist vocation, but rather on the possibility 
of outsourcing its task to any combination of logico­
mathematical and empirical approaches.”25 
The problem is that even accepting it, even if the 
philosophical analysis consists of an independent level by 
its own, some connection with its empirical assumptions 
and with the formal models related to empirical data (NLP, 
graph modeling, data mining, semantic statistical results, 
deontic and non-monotonic logical models, etc.) is still 
needed. How conceptual design relate to the social data that 
trigger and enable its construction? What kind of “structural 
coupling” could be put in place between the philosophical 
architecture of IE and their fields of application? Would it 
not be possible to connect some of the alleged concepts 
with social (ethical, legal, political) indicators? 
As a matter of fact, Floridi’s LoA seems to seek the 
connection among theoretical concepts, the philosophical 
layer, and empirical knowledge. To my view, Whitehead’s 
fallacy of misplaced concreteness is accurately avoided, 
but if this inner connection cannot be made explicit with real 
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use cases, it is easy to fall into the fallacy of composition, 
especially because the relationship between micro and 
macro-ethics is not directly focused in the book, and the 
author shifts from individual to collective agency. 
Stemming from the two last chapters—on distributed 
morality and global information ethics—there is still room 
to figure out a reasonable answer to such questions. The 
degree of ontological friction, or the degree of resilience 
or tolerance, appear especially apt to be measured. The 
same for the “moral enablers” (trust, transparence) on the 
sociological layer that the author calls infra-ethics. This 
layer could be coupled with some complementary ideas 
coming from the “science of the web” and on “web social 
machines.”26 
I will end my comments with a final statement on the 
digital divide and inequality. Reading these last chapters 
I have had the impression that some of the assertions on 
global information ethics were putting aside or shelving 
some facts that can show the present deep differences in 
accessibility to resources and potential pitfalls of the web. 
The infosphere is not the same for everybody. Let’s look at 
some examples. According to the numbers that Cambridge 
mathematician Timothy Gowers made public on scientific 
research, the profit margins of the major commercial STM 
publishers, such as Elsevier, Springer, Wiley Blackwell, and 
Informa, are in the order of 35 percent.27 
There are then severe restrictions to accessing knowledge 
for those that are not in the position to pay such high costs. 
Gathering and constructing reliable data on the web is also 
difficult, painful, and time consuming. Some years ago, 
chief scientist Kimberly Claffy, from UCSD-CAIDA Super-
computation Center, wrote a seminal, sound, and well-
informed article about the economic and legal obstacles 
she had to overcome to mapping the web: “Our scientific 
knowledge about the Internet is weak, and the obstacles 
to progress are primarily issues of economics, ownership, 
and trust, rather than technical.”28 I don’t think the situation 
is much different now with the raising of big data. National 
governments, big companies, national citizens, and digital 
neighbors—people belonging to the digital neighborhood
of crisis mappers, NGO’s volunteers, etc.)—might not share 
the same interests and have different conflicting values. 
Since the Justinian Code, traditional regulations—laws, 
statutes, and rights—in Western culture are based on 
power, discrimination, and inequality (i.e., on the making 
of conceptual boundaries and differences among subjects, 
groups, elites, and classes grounded on and backed by the 
force of arms as last resort). 
The author of the book could consider these barriers when 
balancing facts and values to apply information ethics 
principles. More changes are required related to the 
structure and composition of regulations, and what they 
mean to our culture, to face the challenges he is pointing 
out in the volume. Some kind of legal imagination should 
be at stake to cope with digital rights, rules, and norms. 
The very concept of law (and consequently the Rule of Law) 
cannot remain unchanged either, especially if the author 
is going to postulate a fundamental “ontic trust binding 
agents and patients,” “a primeval, entirely hypothetical 
pact, logically predating the social contract.”29 
Why should this pact be binding? And how? And to whom? 
To some extent, Floridi is changing the rules of the game. 
The methodology of LoA and previous meta-theorical IE 
and agency schemes do not hold here. This kind of “pre­
logical” and “hypothetical” explanatory constructs—such 
as the Kelsenian Grundnorm—were already postulated 
and discussed in similar terms by neo-Kantian and 
phenomenologist legal philosophers in the Weimar 
Republic, following the legacy of the German nineteenth-
century dogmatic Konstruktion. The architecture and 
rational structure of the state and the difference between 
legality and legitimacy were one of the main topics in 
their updated discussions on the Leviathan. I do not think 
the author is really willing to start again with this kind of 
discourses to link IE to policies and legal issues. At a certain 
level, I think he will unavoidably have to face the problem 
of power within the infosphere. But this task is by far too 
complex to tackle without the aid of legal, policy, and 
economic analyses. I would encourage him to expand the 
scope of IE in this direction. Actually, a closer look at recent 
publications would reveal some steps.30 With The Ethics of 
the Information he has already done a very good job. He is 
not in need of fictions. For the time coming, better to not 
wake up the sleeping dogs. 
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9.	 See, for all, Ernst Cassirer, Die Philosophie der Aufklärung. 
10. Floridi, The Ethics of the Information, 204 and 160. 
11. Ibid., 8. 
12. Ibid., 227. 
13. Ibid., 123. 
14. Ibid., 62. 
15. Ibid., 134. 
16. Ibid., 158. 
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19.	 G. Andrighetto et al., Normative Multi-Agent Systems, Schloss 
Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für lnformatik GmbH. 
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20. Cfr. the recent works of Peter Øhrstrøm and his team about it. 
E.g., Øhrstrøm et al., “Jacob Lorhard’s Ontology,” 74–87. 
21.	 Nicola Guarino and Pierdaniele Giaretta, “Ontologies and 
Knowledge Bases. Towards a Terminological Clarification.” 
22. “A specification of a representational vocabulary for a shared 
domain of discourse—definitions of classes, relations, functions, 
and other objects—is called an “ontology.” Thomas R. Gruber, 
“A Translation Approach to Portable Ontology Specifications,” 
199. For updated methodology on ontology building, see Mari 
Carmen Suárez-Figueroa et al., “The NeOn Methodology for 
Ontology Engineering,” 9–34. 
23. Floridi, The Ethics of the Information, 6. 
24. Ibid., 298. 
25. Ibid., 2. 
26. Tim Berners-Lee et al., “A Framework for Web Science”; Jim 
Hendler and Tim Berners-Lee, “From the Semantic Web to Social 
Machines: A Research Challenge for AI on the World Wide Web.” 
27.	 Elsevier’s profit was £826 million in 2013. Twenty Russell Group 
university libraries in the UK now pay Elsevier alone nearly £16 
million per annum. Oxford University subsequently revealed it 
spends nearly £1 million a year with Elsevier (C. Steele, “Who 
Owns Scholarly Knowledge”). 
28. Kimberly Claffy, Top Ten Things Lawyers Should Know about the 
Internet, 2. 
29.	 Floridi, The Ethics of the Information, 301. 
30. Ibid.; Mariarosario Taddeo and Luciano Floridi, 	The Ethics of 
Information Warfare. 
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Mary’s Acquaintance 
Peter Boltuc 
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT SPRINGFIELD AND AUSTRALIAN
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
This paper is largely about the Knowledge Argument. I 
argue that not all physical knowledge is easily accessible 
to human beings as knowledge by description. Human 
cognitive architecture is the cause of this lack, not 
limitations on physicalism. 
The paper is also about the philosophical method. 
Computer science and neuroscience provide the methods 
that traditional philosophical approach, related primarily to 
semantics and philosophy of language, lacks and has a dire 
need for. This approach goes beyond computationalism, 
for many reasons;1 the present article relies primarily on 
biologically inspired cognitive architectures (BICA).2 
The article may seem like an argument in favor of reductive 
physicalism, but this is not the case. I only show that the 
knowledge argument against physicalism does not work. 
In order to clarify my broader position, briefly, I end with 
a surprise note in favor of non-reductive approaches. The 
non-reductive argument, sketched out here, is not focused 
on qualia but more directly on first-person consciousness. 
This paper, and especially the postscript, is a bit of a 
pre-print, an invitation for discussion before the final 
formulation of my position emerges. Comments are very 
welcome.3 
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